University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications: Political Science

Political Science, Department of

2016

Political Neuroscience
Ingrid J. Haas
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, ihaas2@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub
Part of the Biological Psychology Commons, and the Models and Methods Commons
Haas, Ingrid J., "Political Neuroscience" (2016). Faculty Publications: Political Science. 74.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscifacpub/74

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications: Political Science by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln.

Published in Neuroimaging Personality, Social Cognition, and Character, ed. John R. Absher & Jasmin Cloutier
(Academic/Elsevier, 2016), pp. 355–370. doi 10.1016/B978-0-12-800935-2.00019-1
Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. Used by permission.
digitalcommons.unl.edu

Political Neuroscience
Ingrid J. Haas
Department of Political Science and Center for Brain, Biology, and Behavior,
University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA

Outline
1. Political Neuroscience

2. A Brief Overview of Neuroimaging Methods
2.1 Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging

2.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
2.3 Electroencephalography

3. Important Questions in Political Neuroscience
4. Political Attitudes and Evaluation

4.1 The Psychology of Political Attitudes
4.2 Political Evaluation

4.3 Motivated Reasoning
4.4 Attitude Change

5. Social Cognition and Politics
6. Emotion and Politics

6.1 Social Psychological Models of Emotion
6.2 Models of Emotion and Politics

7. Individual Differences in Political Behavior
7.1 Ideological Differences
7.1.1 Brain Structure
7.1.2 Brain Function

7.2 Values

7.3 Political Interest and Expertise

8. Directions for Future Research
9. Conclusion
References

1. Political Neuroscience
The field of political science has traditionally had close ties
to disciplines like economics, history, and sociology. While
political science has always been somewhat interdisciplinary
in nature, in recent years this interdisciplinary approach has
expanded to include biology, psychology, and neuroscience.
This interest in the human sciences has led to the development of new subfields within political science, including
biopolitics, political psychology, and political neuroscience
(also called neuropolitics). What these new subfields have
in common is an interest in individual human behavior and
decision-making as an approach to understanding political
behavior. While political science has traditionally focused on
understanding politics in the aggregate, new methods and
techniques are improving our ability to understand political
behavior at the individual level and consider how individual
differences in information processing may give rise to political behavior that is observed at the mass level.
While political science, psychology, and neuroscience
have fairly distinct intellectual histories, it makes sense to
combine them. While some political scientists think about
politics as a special type of human behavior, and some psychologists dismiss the study of politics as too applied, a case
can be made for the idea that politics and psychology share
significant overlap. From the perspective of human evolution and the development of social behavior, it seems clear
that social and political behavior have been historically intertwined.1,2 Just as the brain evolved to deal with larger
and larger social groups, it became necessary to consider
how those groups should be governed. From this perspective, it seems obvious to suggest that political behavior can
be understood through the lens of human psychology, biology, and neuroscience.
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As with any interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach, there are a number of challenges for researchers
working in this area. While it has become increasingly clear
that recent advances in social and cognitive neuroscience
will help improve our understanding of political behavior,
there are significant challenges that arise when trying to
engage in this type of multilevel analysis—it is not always
easy to translate what happens at the neural level into much
more abstract notions about how society functions.
In this chapter, I will outline the contributions that political neuroscience has made thus far and discuss areas
where political neuroscience may have the most to contribute moving forward. The chapter will focus on four important questions within political psychology and discuss the
role for neuroimaging work within these areas: (1) political
attitudes and evaluation, (2) social cognition and politics,
(3) emotion and politics, and (4) individual differences in
political behavior. Given that political neuroscience is in its
infancy, the discussion of work in this area will be supplemented with relevant work from social and cognitive neuroscience, as well as social and political psychology more
broadly. I think political scientists and neuroscientists can
benefit from firmly grounding their ideas in social psychological theory, and social psychologists can benefit from an
increasing understanding of brain function, as well as increased consideration of the role of context. After reviewing the current state of the literature in political neuroscience, I will offer some suggestions for future work.

2. A Brief Overview of Neuroimaging
Methods
Many of the chapters in this volume will no doubt discuss neuroimaging methodology in extensive detail, but
it is worth providing a brief overview here of neuroimaging methods used by political neuroscientists, especially for
those readers who may be new to the field. The growth of
methods like fMRI has been exponential since 1990.3 The
use of these methods to study questions in political neuroscience has followed suit, although I think it is fair to say
that political neuroscience is not quite as well established at
this point. It is still possible to create a (relatively short) list
of all the political neuroscience studies that have been conducted with structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
or functional neuroimaging (fMRI) or electroencephalography (EEG).
There have been multiple attempts to describe how political science and cognitive neuroscience might be able to
learn from one another, perhaps dating back to a special issue of the journal Political Psychology published in 2003.4-6
Although acceptance of this idea has grown, some political
scientists remain skeptical of the idea that adopting neuro-

imaging methods will strengthen the field. More recently,
people have called for balance on this issue—it is important
to not overstate the claims we can make based on methods
like functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) but also
important not to be overly dismissive and to be aware that
this field is still in its infancy.7 These methods are unlikely to
replace traditional methods in political science research, but
they may be used by some political scientists (through additional training or through collaboration) to help supplement our understanding of important questions in the field.
Given that this volume is focused on the role of neuroimaging, my goal here is to discuss neuroimaging research
as it relates to political science. With that in mind, I will focus primarily on research using structural and functional
imaging. It is important to note that a lot of research in the
domain of biopolitics has also begun to investigate these
issues using methods from psychophysiology, but that is
beyond the scope of this chapter. For readers who are less
familiar with these methods, I will offer a brief overview below. It is important to be aware that different methods have
different strengths and weaknesses, and may be amenable
to different types of research questions.

2.1 Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is a technology that allows researchers to take three-dimensional images of the
brain. This technology allows for much more detailed resolution than older imaging technologies like X-ray, CT scan,
or positron emission technology (PET) scan. For example, a
3 Tesla MRI can produce a three-dimensional image of the
brain at a resolution of 1×1×1 mm. Structural MRI can be
used to examine and compare the size and composition of
different subregions within the brain across individuals. In
relation to politics, this technique is most useful for individual difference analyses where different brain regions or
structures are compared across individuals as a function of
some personality trait or characteristic. There are additional
methods available for structural imaging, such as diffusion
tensor imaging (DTI), which allows for measurement of anatomical connections between brain regions. To my knowledge, no studies have used DTI yet to study political differences so I will not discuss that here.

2.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Magnetic resonance imaging can also be used for research
on brain function. This type of research uses a different
strategy for image collection. While structural imaging produces high-resolution images of the brain, functional imaging typically produces lower resolution images focused not
on structure, but on changes in brain function as a prod-
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uct of some experimental task. It is important to realize that
fMRI relies on indirect measurement of brain activation.8,9
This measurement of brain function is dependent on what
is known as the blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal. The basic assumption of fMRI is that measurement of
increased cerebral blood flow using the BOLD signal can
serve as a proxy for increased neural activity. While this idea
is relatively well-established at this point, questions remain
about exactly what the BOLD response represents. Neuroscientists have argued that the BOLD response is more
closely tied to input and processing within a brain region
and less related to output or “spiking” from that region.8,9
There are some important caveats to be aware of related to the interpretation of fMRI data. First, any signal
produced is a relative (not absolute) measure of activation.
As you will see in the description of political neuroscience
work in the sections that follow, typically any results from
an fMRI study are discussed in terms of contrast effects
(i.e., observing greater activation for one condition compared to a baseline, control, or second experimental condition). Second, analysis of fMRI data is highly dependent
on assumptions about the BOLD signal-data is typically analyzed using the hemodynamic response function (HRF),
which assumes that the BOLD signal peaks about four to
six seconds after stimulus presentation and then returns
to baseline.9 Finally, fMRI data is correlational—you can
show support for a relationship between BOLD activation
and stimuli or task demands, but it is difficult to establish
causal relationships. Simply showing that brain activation
is related to some task does not establish that region is
necessary for the task, and researchers who study social
or political behavior need to be aware that some of the
brain activation they observe may be due to basic cognitive processes (e.g., viewing a stimulus, task switching demands). Careful experimental design can help ameliorate
some of these concerns related to interpretation, but it is
worth being cautious when interpreting fMRI data.

The primary strength of EEG is its ability to measure electrophysiological responses in a matter of milliseconds. EEG
uses a net of electrodes that is placed on the scalp and
measures surface-level electrical activity. The primary difficulty with EEG is determining where those electrical signals
are coming from. Although methods for source localization have become significantly more refined over the years,
the spatial resolution from EEG cannot compete with spatial resolution obtained through fMRI and it can be difficult
to obtain a signal from subcortical regions (e.g., amygdala)
using EEG. Most of the work in political neuroscience that I
will discuss in this chapter has used structural or functional
MRI, but there have also. been some studies in this area using EEG, which I will describe below.

2.3 Electroencephalography

Social psychologists have been interested in the properties
of attitude structure, function, and change for quite some
time. Traditional work in this area has relied most heavily
on self-reported attitudes, using measurement tools such
as Likert scales or semantic differentials, and these were
among the first measurement tools to be adopted by political scientists interested in studying attitudes. More recently, there has been a burgeoning interest in implicit or
indirect attitude measurement, typically relying on cognitive response latency measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT)10 or the Affective Misattribution Procedure
(AMP).11,12 Along with these shifts in methodology have
been related shifts in attitude theory. Given that we now
have two different categories of measurement techniques,

There is an often discussed trade-off when discussing fMRI
versus electroencephalography (EEG) and other neuroimaging methods. While fMRI provides superior spatial resolution, EEG provides superior temporal resolution. This is
sometimes mistaken to mean that fMRI provides no information about timecourse, which is not exactly true. Data
from fMRI allow for examination of the timecourse on a
slower scale—in terms of seconds as opposed to milliseconds with EEG. It is also important to realize that EEG and
fMRI are not measuring the same thing—EEG measures
electrical activity, whereas fMRI is dependent on the BOLD
signal, as discussed above.

3. Important Questions in Political
Neuroscience
In the sections that follow, I will provide an overview of political neuroscience research related to four important questions within political psychology: (1) how do people evaluate
political information?, (2) how do people think about and
process politically similar and dissimilar others?, (3) what is
the impact of emotion on politics?, and (4) how do individual differences influence political thought and behavior?
For each section, I will provide an overview of the relevant
research in political neuroscience, placing this work in the
context of social and political psychology, as well as social
and cognitive neuroscience. The existing work in political
neuroscience becomes easier to interpret if it is placed in
context, and a broader understanding of research in these
related fields may help to illustrate gaps in the existing work
and help generate ideas for future research.

4. Political Attitudes and Evaluation
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researchers have speculated about what these two types of
measures may represent.
In recent years, there has been a lot of debate within social psychology regarding what are known as dual processing and dual systems models of attitudes. Without getting
too carried away with the details here, researchers have argued back and forth about whether we should consider
implicit and explicit attitudes to be two different types of
attitudes (presumably existing as two different types of attitudes stored in the brain or related, to different types of
memory or processing)13-15 versus a focus on implicit and
explicit measures tapping into the same attitudinal information (but sometimes producing different “attitudes” at least
in terms of measurement outcome).16,17 This debate over
dual system versus dual process models of attitudes can potentially be informed by greater understanding of the neural underpinnings of evaluation.
In recent years, social cognitive neuroscience has
weighed in on this question by suggesting that we should
focus not on different types of attitudes per se, but on the
process of evaluation. In a recent model of attitudes and
evaluation informed by neurobiology, the Iterative Reprocessing (IR) Model, Cunningham and Zelazo proposed that
the process of evaluation should be understood as unfolding over time.6,18 Attitudinal information is stored in memory and accessed as needed to provide evaluations relevant
to the current situation or context. This process is iterative,
meaning that attitudes can be updated as new information
is received externally or additional information is accessed
internally. So, different “attitudes” may result from implicit
versus explicit measures capturing the current evaluation at
different time points or after varying degrees of information
processing, updating, and reorganization.
The IR Model proposes a network of brain regions that
are likely implicated in the process of evaluation, including
subcortical regions like the amygdala, insula, and hypothalamus, regions that allow for additional processing, like the
anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex, as well as regions likely involved in higher-order processing, such as areas of prefrontal cortex (PFC—dorsolateral PFC, ventrolateral PFC, and rostrolateral PFC).16,18 Many of these regions
have also been implicated in studies of political neuroscience (see Figure 1 for a visual representation).19 These regions allow for the integration of sensory information with
affective knowledge and are thought to combine to produce
an evaluation in any given situation.16,18 Importantly, the IR
Model can explain potential differences in implicit versus
explicit measurement of attitudes by inserting the concept
of time. Initial responses are likely to be somewhat rapid
and automatic (amygdala, insula), while later responses allow time for regions involved in more reflective processing

to become involved (anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral
PFC, rostrolateral PFC, and ventrolateral PFC).

Figure 1. Brain regions and structures that are most commonly
observed in studies of political neuroscience: views of (A) coronal, (B) sagittal, and (C) midsagittal planes. Reprinted with permission from Jost et al. 2014 (Ref. 19).
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Importantly, recent work in social neuroscience has suggested that we may need to further reevaluate how we
think about attitudes. While the distinction between automatic versus controlled processes has been generative for
research, it may not be reflective of how the brain actually
works. While some processes do happen more rapidly than
others, even rapid evaluative processes (e.g., amygdala) are
subject to guidance and input from what we would typically think about as more “controlled” systems. Consistent
with this view, we have shown that amygdala activation is
sensitive to evaluative goals.20 Given that people are constantly monitoring the environment for stimuli and events
that are goal congruent or incongruent, it makes sense that
even early Signals in the brain are sensitive to this information as well.

4.1 The Psychology of Political Attitudes
Political psychology research on political attitudes and evaluation has focused on similar issues in the context of politics. Many of these debates in political psychology have mirrored debates in social psychology—examining the role of
online versus memory-based evaluation, automatic versus
controlled processing, and the automaticity of affect. A number of papers, for example, have shown support for the “Hot
Cognition Hypothesis,” or the idea that political attitudes are
affectively charged and that this affective response is automatically activated upon encountering a stimulus.21-23 This
theory is somewhat reminiscent of the now infamous debate
between Zajonc and Lazarus about the primacy of affect,24,25
with Lodge and colleagues coming down on the side of Zajonc, arguing for the primacy of affect. Most of the neuroimaging work in political neuroscience related to attitudes and
evaluation has focused on the evaluation of political policies
or candidates, both in terms of rapid, automatic processes
and slower, more controlled processes.

4.2 Political Evaluation
The amygdala has been implicated in multiple aspects of
evaluative processing, including attitudes toward political candidates. One early study in political neuroscience
scanned participants while they completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT) using names and faces of well-known
Democratic (e.g., Hillary Clinton, Al Gore) and Republican
politicians (e.g., Condoleezza Rice, Ronald Reagan).26 Results showed that the amygdala responded to familiar faces,
and the strength of the amygdala response was related to
the strength of the affective response (positive or negative)
toward both parties and candidates. This study also found
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fusiform gyrus activation for familiar faces and prefrontal
cortex activation for various aspects of the task. While the
authors conclude that these results are consistent with a
dual processing view of attitudes, I think that is somewhat
difficult to discern based on the results of this one study.
The prefrontal cortex activation, for example, could have
been related to activation of stereotypic knowledge, as they
suggest, or more generally related to the cognitive demands
of completing a task like the lAT.
More recently, researchers have examined the amygdala
response to political candidates across cultures, showing
that the amygdala responded more strongly to faces of
candidates that participants chose to vote for in samples
from both the United States and Japan. However, the results
from this study also showed that overall, the amygdala responded more strongly to cultural outgroup members than
ingroup members. As with the previous study, the interpretation of these results is somewhat dependent on current
theories of the amygdala’s role in evaluative processing.
Historically, the amygdala was thought to respond primarily to negative or fear-inducing stimuli,28-30 but more recent work has shown that the amygdala also responds to
positive,31-33 arousing,34 uncertain,35 or motivationally relevant20,36,37 stimuli. Given this ambiguity in terms of amygdala function, the only thing we can really conclude here is
that participants probably viewed these candidates as relevant in some way and, given that participants chose to vote
for them, we might assume that the amygdala response is
related to positive evaluations. However, future work might
be able to examine situations where this does or does not
hold. From a political science perspective, we know that
people sometimes vote because they are excited about their
preferred candidate. However, it is also possible that people vote because they are opposed to the candidate from
the other party. Given that the amygdala responds to emotional intensity or relevance, it could be the case that this
pattern of responding would differ depending on some of
these contextual or individual difference variables, but that
is speculative at this point.
Other researchers have focused on examining what happens when people view faces of candidates they dislike. For
example, Kaplan and colleagues showed participants pictures of the 2004 Presidential candidates’ faces (i.e., George
W. Bush, John Kerry, Ralph Nader) during fMRI, demonstrating that when people were viewing opposition candidates,
there was greater activation in dorsolateral PFC and anterior cingulate.38 The authors suggest that this activation may
be consistent with the idea that participants were engaging cognitive control processes to regulate the negative responses, but because this was a passive viewing task, there
is no direct evidence for this hypothesis. Future work could
try to test this more directly.
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More recent work has shown that this activation in insula
and anterior cingulate to disliked candidates is also predictive of election outcomes.39 Real-world candidates (selected
from recent Congressional and Governor races) for whom
participants showed greater activation in these areas were
more likely to lose elections. Importantly, these researchers also showed that negative trait perceptions (i.e., threat)
related to this activation were more predictive of election
outcomes than positive trait perceptions, suggesting that
there may be an overall negativity bias in candidate evaluation. While this is consistent with a variety of work showing evidence for a general negativity bias in evaluation,40,41
it is worth noting that this study relied on rapid trait evaluations of candidates. Given more time, it is possible that
positive information may have played a greater role in evaluation. In other words, it is possible that part of the reason
for the negativity bias is that negative information has some
degree of primacy in terms of temporal processing. Indeed,
there do seem to be differences in terms of negative versus
positive perceptions of ambiguous stimuli leading to activation in more ventral versus dorsal regions within the amygdala.42 So, while it is possible that initial, negative perceptions may help drive perceptions of political candidates, it
is worth considering the role of both ambivalence and time
allowing for correction or modification of these early evaluative responses in future work.
One remaining question here is whether there are differences between active versus passive viewing of political candidates, perhaps being representative of the distinction between automatic versus controlled processing
or implicit versus explicit attitudes. Although, it is important to remember that this distinction is likely an oversimplification of how the brain processes information.43 To examine the role of attention, participants in a recent study
viewed pictures of German politicians during fMRI and either attended to the pictures or viewed the pictures while
completing a demanding visual fixation task.44 Politicians
represented either the Christian Democratic Union Party
or the Social Democratic Party. The researchers could then
examine whether brain function differed during active versus passive viewing, and as a function of candidates’ party
affiliation. When politicians were unattended, they found
that regardless of party affiliation, preference for candidates was related to activation in ventral striatum, a region
often implicated in reward processing. Preferences for candidates of one’s preferred party was related to processing
in additional regions, including. insula and cingulate cortex
(both anterior and posterior regions). This work is consistent with theories in political psychology such as the “Hot
Cognition Hypothesis,” suggesting that people have a tendency to automatically process political information (i.e.,
faces of political candidates).

4.3 Motivated Reasoning
Another important question in political psychology has
been to examine the role of motivated reasoning. Classic
research on attitudes in social psychology, for example,
showed that people were able to distort incoming information to be consistent with their prior beliefs, whether they
were in favor of or opposed to the death penalty.45 Kunda
offered a theoretical overview of motivated reasoning, suggesting that people experience conflict between the motivation for accuracy versus the motivation to reach desired
conclusions.46 More recently, researchers have begun to examine the neural underpinnings of these effects.
In another early study in political neuroscience, Westen
and colleagues examined motivated reasoning by asking
participants to make judgments during fMRI about information that was threatening to either their own candidate,
an opposing candidate, or a neutral control target.47 Data
was collected from “committed partisans” during the 2004
U.S. Presidential election. The study found behavioral evidence for motivated reasoning, showing that Democrats
were more likely to perceive contradictions from George
W. Bush and vice versa, Republicans were more likely to
perceive contradictions from John Kerry. When participants
were engaged in motivated reasoning, a network of regions
was involved including ventromedial PFC, anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, insula, and lateral orbitofrontal cortex. Given that many of these regions (e.g., insula, ACC, lateral OFC) are involved in processing negative information,
detecting conflict, and integrating cognitive, and affective
responses,48-51 this overall pattern of results, seems consistent with what we would expect when people are engaged
in motivated reasoning. Interestingly, the study also found
that when participants were given the opportunity to resolve this inconsistency, activation in ventral striatum was
observed. Given that the ventral striatum has often been
implicated in reward processing,52,53 this is consistent with
the view that resolving inconsistency may be experienced
as rewarding.

4.4 Attitude Change
While research on motivated reasoning has shown that people often maintain preexisting attitudes through biased reasoning processes, it is important to note that attitudes can
and do change in response to new information. Indeed, this
was an important part of Kunda’s theory—people are also
motivated by a desire for accuracy and may abandon desired conclusions if the counter-attitudinal evidence is overwhelming.46 Attitude change is more likely to occur when
people do not hold strong preferences to begin with, or
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when attitudes are weaker or less certain.54 Attitudes can
become stronger—a positive attitude might become even
more positive, or they can change valence—a positive attitude might become a negative attitude, for example. Importantly, given our understanding of attitudes, these positive and negative processes appear to be independent of
one another.55 So, thinking of an attitude purely as positive
versus negative is likely an oversimplification. Attitudes can
contain some degree of positive information, negative information, both (ambivalence), or neither (apathy).
Researchers have begun to examine what leads to both
positive and negative political attitude change using fMRI. It
appears that different regions of the prefrontal cortex may
be implicated in positive versus negative change. One study
showed that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex response to
negative campaign videos predicted attitude change in a
negative direction—lower ratings of a political candidate.56
It has been suggested that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is
involved in cognitive control and reprocessing of evaluative
information,16,18,57 consistent with the idea that it may be
involved in attitude change, especially for more abstracted
information. The Kato study also showed a relationship between medial prefrontal cortex and increased ratings of candidates.56 This may be consistent with a larger body of work,
suggesting that medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in
Theory of Mind58—imagining the mental states of others—
and is more likely to occur when thinking about people we
like (as opposed to those we dislike).59 That work will be described in more detail below.

5. Social Cognition and Politics
The, term social cognition means different things to different people, but for the purposes of this chapter I will focus
primarily on discussing issues related to Theory of Mind or
mentalizing. The overarching question guiding research in
this area has been to determine how people think about
and make decisions about the behavior of other people.
Research on Theory of Mind has focused on understanding how people think about or “mentalize” about the
minds of others. Engaging in this process allows individuals to think about the causes of others’ behavior and anticipate how others will respond to them. At this point, the
neural underpinnings of Theory of Mind are fairly well established. Neuroimaging work has primarily focused on the
role of the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal
junction.58,60 Interestingly, recent work has shown that people may deploy this resource somewhat strategically. Kozak
and colleagues showed, for example, that people were more
likely to engage in Theory of Mind processing for liked versus disliked others.59
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In the political context, social cognition research has
been applied primarily to understanding how people think
about political candidates or politicians, although there are
also examples of work examining how people think about
politically similar or dissimilar others. This work has primarily
focused on the role of the medial prefrontal cortex. Mitchell and colleagues hypothesized that people would be more
likely to mentalize about politically similar versus dissimilar others.61 During fMRI, participants were presented with
other people who either held similar or dissimilar political
views. They found that ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation was greater for similar others, whereas dorsal medial prefrontal cortex activation was greater for dissimilar
others. This is consistent with the behavioral work showing
that people engage in mentalizing somewhat selectively.59
Additional brain regions have been implicated in perspective taking, aside from the medial prefrontal cortex. In
an fMRI study conducted immediately prior to the 2008
election, Falk and colleagues showed that taking the perspective of a same party candidate resulted in greater
poster cingulate cortex activation, whereas taking the perspective of an opposing candidate led to activation in bilateral temporoparietal junction and insula.62 While many
of these regions have been implicated in social cognition
processes, it is still somewhat unclear why different regions
within this network would respond differentially to ingroup
versus outgroup targets. Given that there have only been
two studies (to my knowledge) on the political neuroscience
of perspective taking and Theory of Mind, this area is ripe
for future investigation.

6. Emotion and Politics
Political science has had a long relationship with fields like
economics that focus more on rational choice models of
decision-making. But with increasing interest in psychology and neuroscience, some political scientists have expressed a growing interest in understanding both biases in
human information processing and the role of emotion. It
is worth noting that it is not necessarily the case that emotion leads to biased reasoning. It certainly can, but it is important to realize that emotion probably exists because it
was adaptive. The amygdala’s role in fear detection, for example, likely evolved because it was adaptive for both human and nonhuman animals to prioritize their response to
threatening stimuli.37 Disgust is another emotion that is often described in terms of its evolutionary origins.63 Most of
the recent work on emotion in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience has focused on trying to understand the
structure and function of emotion. Political scientists are interested in emotion insofar as it helps to explain political
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behavior. So, the focus for political scientists is more on how
emotion influences political evaluation and decision making.

6.1 Social Psychological Models of Emotion
Social psychologists have offered many different theories of emotion over the years, with one potential starting
point being the basic emotion models. These models attempted to specify a set of emotions that were both basic and universal—the list typically included the basic six:
happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise.64,65
While there is some evidence that the basic emotions map
on to facial expressions, the evidence for unique neural
substrates for each of these emotions is rather limited,
perhaps even nonexistent.66,67 A more recent approach to
emotion informed by work in affective neuroscience suggests that psychological constructivism is likely the more
appropriate approach.66 From this perspective, there is a
network of brain regions involved in social and affective
processes across emotion categories. Given that the basic emotion models may have limited explanatory power,
social psychologists have proposed other models of emotion over the years—most can be considered either dimensional or appraisal models of emotion.
Both dimensional and appraisal models have evolved
and have become more complicated over time, especially
given recent work in affective neuroscience, but I will summarize the basic arguments here. The dimensional models
of emotion typically attempt to simplify emotions into two
or more dimensions. The most popular version being Russell’s Circumplex Model, which includes both valence (ranging from positive to negative) and arousal (ranging from low
to high).68 These dimensions are orthogonal, so emotions
can be positive or negative and high in arousal (e.g., fear,
excitement) or low in arousal (e.g., contentment, sadness).
From this perspective, it is important to consider both valence and arousal when examining the role of emotions—
to see if the impact of a given emotion is; due to its valence,
arousal, or some interaction of the two.
Appraisal models of emotion have focused more directly
on the cognitive processes that give rise to the experience.
of emotions—suggesting that emotions are constructed to
help people deal with specific types of situations and respond appropriately. Appraisal models have taken different forms over the years, but typically suggest that people have some sort of physiological or affective response,
which then gets interpreted in light of the current situation
or context and then gets labeled as a specific emotion.25
This view is probably most consistent with the psychological constructivism approach advanced by scholars like Lisa
Feldman Barrett.66,67 Indeed, some of the newer appraisal
models are directly informed by research on affective and
computational neuroscience.69

Importantly, the appraisal models have helped to elucidate the idea that emotions, which may look similar in
dimensional models, may actually have distinct behavioral outcomes. For example, fear and anger are both higharousal negative emotions but have been shown to lead to
different outcomes in relation to risky behavior.70 In general,
fear is more likely to lead to avoidance behavior, whereas
anger is more likely to lead to approach behavior.71 Research on emotion and politics has only just begun to incorporate and adapt these models of emotion to increase
our understanding of political behavior.

6.2 Models of Emotion and Politics
Political scientists have begun to incorporate models of
emotion into their research, but I think it is fair to say that
there is still much work to be done in this area. Early work
in the area of emotion and politics focused on positive versus negative emotions, largely assuming that all negative
emotions should lead to similar outcomes. However, consistent with dimensional or appraisal models of emotion
discussed above, the work in political psychology has increasingly shown that emotions cannot be collapsed into a
simple valence dimension, and even emotions that look similar in terms of a dimensional analysis—fear and anger, for example—lead to different outcomes in political behavior.72,73
There have been some attempts to synthesize the current
state of research on emotion and politics, and interested
readers may want to review edited volumes such as The Affect Effect for more background.74 I will give a brief overview
of some of the recent work in political science below.
Research on emotion and politics has shown that positive
and negative emotions have differential impact on politics,
but also that different negative emotions may have different outcomes. For example, building on appraisal models of
emotion, Huddy and colleagues have, attempted to distinguish among anxiety, anger, and threat, showing that each
of these emotions has distinct connections to foreign policy preferences.75,76 Other work has examined how these
emotions are connected to candidate appraisals and voting behavior, showing that emotions like hope and anger
may be most likely to lead to voter mobilization.77 In contrast, emotions like anxiety may be more likely to lead people to abstain from voting or reconsider their options and
switch sides.78 At this point, there is only one major theory
of emotion and politics that has been put forth, and I will
outline that theory below.
One of the primary theories in political science of how
emotion influences politics is the Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT).78,79 Marcus and colleagues have argued for this
theory on the basis of neurobiological models of affect, suggesting that there is an important distinction to be made
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between behavior in familiar versus unfamiliar contexts.
When objects or situations are familiar, people can rely on
preexisting attitudes and beliefs to guide behavior either
toward (for appetitive stimuli) or away (for aversive stimuli) from that stimulus. When situations are unfamiliar, AIT
argues that people will experience greater anxiety and engage in additional information search in order to gain the
information necessary to direct behavior in that situation.
From this perspective, political scientists have shown support for the idea that anxiety leads to increased attention
and political learning,80 consideration of opposing viewpoints, and willingness to compromise.81 While this may be
consistent with some of the research on uncertainty in social
psychology and cognitive neuroscience, it is largely inconsistent with the large body of work linking uncertainty (and
anxiety) to threat, suggesting the interplay of these affective states may be more complicated than initially assumed.
From a motivational perspective, uncertainty can serve
as a signal that we are lacking enough information to deal
with situational challenges appropriately.82 While informational uncertainty may sometimes lead to an increase in
epistemic motives, other types of uncertainty (e.g., personal
uncertainty) may be inherently more threatening and lead
to the opposite response—increased closed-mindedness.83
One way to examine this question is to treat uncertainty and
threat as distinct conceptual variables (see Figure 2). Threat
can be understood as the potential for harm, whereas uncertainty is often more ambiguous and context-dependent, signaling any lack of information or clarity on some
issue.84,85 From this perspective, uncertainty and threat interact to produce distinct affective states that may then lead
to distinct behavioral outcomes.
In some of our work, we hypothesized that the effects of
uncertainty on political tolerance would differ as a function
of context—namely, whether the uncertainty was associated
with threat or not (see Figure 3).84 In an experimental context, we found that threat moderated the impact of uncertainty on political tolerance. Uncertainty increased tolerance
in a neutral or positive context, but decreased tolerance in
a threatening context. In a more recent study, I found support for a similar pattern of results with respect to support
for compromise—uncertainty increased support for compromise in a relatively neutral or positive context, but had
no effect on support for compromise in a more threatening
context.86 We are currently investigating the neural underpinnings of this interaction, both in terms of basic affective
processes and political information processing. Preliminary
analyses have shown that the amygdala, for example, responds differentially to uncertainty associated with negative versus positive affective information.85
I have included a section about emotion and politics here
not because there is a wealth of neuroimaging research on
the topic, but because I think there should be. This is an
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Figure 2. Conceptual relationship between uncertainty and
threat. Reprinted with permission from Haas et al. 2014 (Ref 84).

Figure 3. Hypothesized relationship between uncertainty and
political tolerance as a function of threat. Reprinted with permission from Haas et al. 2014 (Ref 84).

area of research where neuroimaging methods may be useful, and there is plenty of opportunity in terms of available
research questions. It is important to realize that the future
goals of this research are unlikely to be quite so simple as
mapping the neural pathways that differentiate basic emotional responses. I think a more useful approach, at least in
terms of the implications for politics, will be to focus on examining how different emotional experiences change political information processing. While existing research in this
area is limited, there has been a fair amount of work examining individual differences in response to affective stimuli,
primarily between political liberals versus conservatives. In
the following section, I will provide an overview of political
neuroscience research on individual differences.

7. Individual Differences in Political
Behavior
One of the questions that fMRI is well-suited for is asking
whether brain function differs across different types of people. Work in political neuroscience has taken advantage of
this to examine differences in social and affective process-
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ing as a function of individual differences in political ideology, values, and political interest and expertise.

7.1 Ideological Differences
Ideological differences has been one of the primary topics
guiding neuroimaging work on politics. The growth of political neuroscience studies on this topic is likely related to
increased interest in both psychological and biological differences between liberals and conservatives. In 2003, Jost
and colleagues published a meta-analysis arguing that conservatism has motivational underpinnings, primarily related
to differential response to negative or threatening information.87 Recent work in the area of biopolitics has largely corroborated this idea, showing that conservatives and liberals
differ in their physiological response to negatively valenced
emotional stimuli.88-92 The relevant neuroimaging work has
used both structural and functional neuroimaging to examine the neural underpinnings of these psychological and
biological differences between liberals and conservatives.
7.1.1 Brain Structure
Given the growing evidence of a link between biology,
genetics, and ideological differences, one possibility is that
liberalism versus conservatism is related to differences in
brain structure. Consistent with this idea, one study has
shown structural brain differences between liberals and
conservatives. Kanai and colleagues used structural MRI to
examine gray matter volume, finding that liberals had increased volume in the anterior cingulate cortex, whereas
conservatives had increased volume in the right amygdala,
left insula, and right entorhinal cortex (see Figure 4).93 While
this work supports the hypothesis that liberals and conservatives have different brain structure, there are multiple
ways to interpret this data and I think some caution is warranted, given that this is just one study.
First, it is probably necessary to consider whether or not
these structural differences are indicative of functional brain
differences. It is not necessarily the case that having more
gray matter in a region means you will find significant differences in function, but it does mean that these brain regions are probably worth examining in subsequent studies of brain function. While this is purely speculative at this
point, the amygdala finding from the Kanai study could be
consistent with behavioral work suggesting that conservatives are more sensitive to threat or negativity than liberals.87,89,94 However, it is important to note that the relationship between amygdala activation and fear or negativity is
not a one-to-one mapping. While the amygdala has been
implicated in fear, it has also been implicated in responses
to positive or arousing information, as discussed earlier in
this chapter.31-33 More recent theorizing about amygdala

function has suggested that the amygdala response is not
specific to positive or negative information per se, but that
the amygdala may respond to any information that is motivationally relevant for the individual.95
Second, structural differences are also difficult to interpret because there is sometimes an assumption that they
are an indicator of biological or genetic differences in brain
growth or development (suggesting the influence of nature
over nurture). An alternative, or perhaps complementary,
viewpoint is that brain structure is influenced not just by
biology and genetics, but also. by psychology and behavior. For example, some recent longitudinal work has shown
that a stress-reduction intervention actually reduced both
reported stress level and gray matter volume in the right
basolateral amygdala.96 So, having a larger amygdala might
increase sensitivity to stress, but a decrease in stress may
also decrease the size of the amygdala. Jost and colleagues
have labeled this the “chicken-and-egg” problem in political neuroscience.19,89 It could be the case that genetic differences shape brain structure in a way that gives rise to
ideological differences, or it could be the case that people
adopt certain patterns of behavior and that behavior then
shapes brain structure. In reality, brain structure is probably
determined by some combination of these two perspectives.
The take-home point is that we need to be careful about assuming causal relationships from studies of brain structure.
Regardless of the causal pathways, the Kanai study93 suggested to researchers that these regions (e.g., the amygdala
and anterior cingulate) are worth examining in future studies of ideology, brain structure, and brain function.

Figure 4. Individual differences in political attitudes and brain structure. Reprinted with permission from Kanai et al. 2011 (Ref 93).
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7.1.2 Brain Function
Research on whether or not brain function differs between liberals and conservatives is still relatively limited, but
the existing research is consistent with the idea that there
may be processing differences in regions implicated in social and affective processing—such as the amygdala, insula,
and anterior cingulate. One recent study showed that during a decision-making task, Democrats showed greater activation in the left insula and Republicans showed greater
activation in the right amygdala.97 Interestingly, while brain
function appeared to differ, the decisions participants made
in this study did not. In other words, it could be the case
that these differences are due, at least in part, to differences
in the decision-making process as opposed to the outcomes.
This conclusion should be treated as tentative at this point,
given that this is just one study and other research has
shown that there may be differences in both process and
outcomes. Using EEG, Amodio and colleagues found that
liberals demonstrated greater conflict-related activity and
were more accurate on a go/no-go task.98 The conflict-related activity on no-go trials was localized to the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, which is one of the regions where
structural differences between liberals and conservatives
have been found.93 Taken together, these studies suggest
that there may be functional differences between liberals
and conservatives in some of the regions where structural
differences were previously found—the amygdala, insula,
and anterior cingulate.
A lot of the recent behavioral work or work in biopolitics has focused on ideological differences in emotional responding, suggesting that liberals and conservatives may
differ in their response to negatively-valenced emotional
stimuli.88,89 Only one study (that I am aware of) has examined this question using neuroimaging. Ahn and colleagues
had participants engage in a passive viewing task during
fMRI using stimuli (emotional images) from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS).99 Consistent with behavioral work showing that conservatives are more responsive to disgust,91,100 conservatives in this study appeared to
be more sensitive to disgusting images (especially those images related to animal mutilation). Liberals showed· greater
activation than conservatives to disgusting stimuli mainly
in the insula, whereas for conservatives, there was greater
activation for this contrast (disgust > neutral) in a whole
network of regions, including the amygdala, hippocampus,
basal ganglia, thalamus, anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. While
this is consistent with the view that conservatives may be
more sensitive to disgusting stimuli than liberals, it is difficult to conclude what processes each of these regions may
have been engaged in, given that this was a passive viewing task. Future work may want to examine differences be-
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tween liberals and conservatives using different tasks that
require additional processing demands (e.g., emotion regulation). It could be the case that liberals and conservatives
respond differently to disgusting images, or they might differentially engage emotion regulation strategies to cope
with the disgust response.
While a growing body of work has suggested that conservatives may be more sensitive to negative information
than liberals,87,99 one alternative perspective is that conservatives are more sensitive to arousal (and not negativity,
per se).89,101 From the perspective of dimensional models
of emotion (see earlier section on Emotion and Politics), it
is important to consider both the valence of emotions and
their level of arousal. If researchers are comparing higharousal negative emotions to low-arousal positive emotions,
any observed differences could be due either to valence
(negative-positive) or arousal (low-high). It is important to
note that the Ahn study did not examine differences between negative versus positive emotions directly, and the
positive images used in the study appear to be lower in
arousal (e.g., animals, babies) than the negative images used
(e.g., snakes, violence, mutilation).99 So, the question about
whether conservatives are more responsive to negative or
highly arousing stimuli, even when positively valenced, remains.101 To examine this question directly, researchers will
need to compare emotional responses to positive and negative stimuli while controlling for, equating, or manipulating arousal.

7.2 Values
An alternative approach to understanding ideological differences in brain function has been to examine differences
in neural processing related to specific values that might
underlie ideological differences. This research builds on a
long tradition in psychology and political science of studying values as a way to understand political attitudes.102 Political ideology has been most closely tied to values related
to preference for tradition versus change and views about
equality.103 Neuroimaging work has attempted to examine the brain activity that might underlie political decisionmaking related to these values, although this work has been
largely exploratory.
Zamboni and colleagues had participants evaluate political beliefs during fMRI and examined the relationship between evaluative processing and values—individualism, conservatism, and radicalism.104 They found differentiation on
the basis of these values: individualism was related to activity in the ventromedial and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction, conservatism was related
to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and radicalism was re-
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lated to the ventral striatum and posterior cingulate. While
this research does suggest that values may be related to
differential processing of political statements, it is still unclear why these differences are occurring or how they map
on to differences in the process of decision-making. The authors do speculate about what this activation might mean—
perhaps individualism-related prefrontal cortex activation
signals self-referential processing, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex activation might be related to additional evaluative
processing for liberals versus conservatives, and radicalism
might be related to greater emotional responses to these
statements.104 It is important to note, however, that these
assumptions are based on reverse inference and may or
may not be corroborated by future work. Additional work
will be needed to test these assumptions directly.
A second study on this topic focused on the role of egalitarianism, showing that egalitarian preferences during a decision-making task were related to activation in the insula
and ventromedial PPC.105 The insula has been implicated in
a number of studies related to emotion and empathy, or just
more general integration of bodily states, so this connection between insula activity and egalitarianism seems plausible. But again, more work will be needed to clearly examine the underlying mechanisms here.

7.3 Political Interest and Expertise
Another important individual difference that has often
been discussed by political scientists is the distinction between political experts versus novices. The classic research
in political science often discussed differences between the
mass public versus political elites, often arguing that political elites were really the only individuals with something
that resembled a political ideology.106 This question has also
been examined through the use of neuroimaging methods,
looking primarily at differences between political experts
versus novices or people who are highly interested in politics versus uninterested.
Interestingly, while the impact of expertise on brain function has often been discussed in a cold, cognitive sense,
purely in relation to knowledge, it may be the case that there
is a motivational component as well. In other words, some
people may actually be motivated to learn or read about politics and may experience that activity as rewarding. Consistent
with this view, Gozzi and colleagues showed that individuals with a strong interest in politics experience greater activation in the amygdala and ventral striatum (putamen) when
reading statements they agreed with.107 While we need to
be careful about making reverse inferences here, this is consistent with the idea that viewing these positive statements
may be rewarding for individuals interested in politics. Interestingly, this may help explain why some political junkies literally cannot stop reading about or watching the news.

8. Directions For Future Research
The field of political neuroscience is relatively young, and
research in this area is fairly limited at this point. While this
makes it difficult to generalize and draw broader conclusions based on the work, I think we do have enough at this
point to say that neuroimaging has the potential to inform
research in political psychology and biopolitics. The challenge for researchers then becomes figuring out how we
should move forward in this interdisciplinary area. Below,
I offer some suggestions for researchers currently working
in the field of political neuroscience, or those who are interested in getting involved in this work.
Most, if not all, of the political neuroscience studies
described here have been exploratory in nature. There is
nothing inherently wrong with this, given that exploratory
research is often the first stage of a larger research program—gathering initial data on important questions can
help clarify theory and generate hypotheses for subsequent research. However, I do think we are getting closer
to the point where we can move out of the initial exploratory phase and into the hypothesis-testing phase.
The main problem with exploratory fMRI studies is that
they are difficult to interpret, for a number of reasons. As
discussed at the outset of this chapter, fMRI data is correlational. It is difficult (if not impossible) to demonstrate
causal relationships using fMRI data. The bigger issue with
these exploratory studies is that interpretation has largely
relied on reverse inference and assumptions about the processes that participants were engaged in during the task.
Now that some of this initial work has been conducted, we
can start to develop more nuanced hypotheses about how
people are processing political information and why we are
observing brain activation in specific regions or networks.
Given that we have specific hypotheses about brain mechanisms, we can carefully design experimental tasks to test
these mechanisms by directly manipulating or measuring
variables of interest. Only through careful experimentation
can we determine, for example, why the amygdala is responding to political candidates, how the amygdala is involved in political evaluation, how this differs across individuals, and what the boundary conditions are that limit or
constrain these effects.
It would be impossible to overemphasize the importance
of careful research design in the fMRI environment. In an
ideal world, any political neuroscience study using fMRI
would include the following: theoretical background, specific hypotheses about brain function, behavioral pilot data,
careful experimental design with multiple conditions, task
data during scanning (as well as relevant postscan ratings),
measurement of relevant individual differences, and great
care taken when drawing conclusions not to overgeneralize or rely on unwarranted reverse inferences about brain
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function. Other scholars have offered similar suggestions
for those working in the field of political neuroscience,7 as
well as those working in social and affective neuroscience
more generally.108
It is worth noting here that there is a relatively steep
learning curve when it comes to learning neuroimaging
methods such as fMRI, so collaboration among interdisciplinary teams should be encouraged. Political scientists interested in working in the area of political neuroscience will
likely benefit from working with social and cognitive psychologists, who have expertise in experimental design, as
well as social and cognitive neuroscientists, who have expertise in conducting research within the MRI context and
dealing with unique considerations for both experimental
design and data analysis. Psychologists and neuroscientists
interested in politics can benefit from working with political scientists, who have expertise in the role of context and
are more well-versed in issues related to external validity.
Many fMRI studies, especially early studies using this methodology, have relied on very small sample sizes, typically
with convenience samples. I think future studies in political
neuroscience will probably want to move toward collecting
data from larger, more diverse samples and attempt to use
that data to predict real-world outcomes, in addition to performance on experimental tasks. These are ambitious goals
and might be difficult for any lone scientist to master but
will likely be easier to tackle in larger, interdisciplinary teams.
There is one very good reason why fMRI studies have
typically relied on small sample sizes—cost. Given the expense attached to doing research using fMRI (as of this
writing, an hour of scan time typically costs around $500 or
$600 at universities in the US), the challenge for researchers becomes trying to figure out if and when fMRI will be a
valuable method to add to their toolbox. Many questions
in political science may not require the use of methods like
fMRI, and researchers should not feel obligated to use these
methods if they are not directly relevant to the questions
they are interested in. fMRI is most likely to be a useful tool
when researchers have ideas about processes or mechanisms that give rise to observable political behavior and
are interested in testing whether or not those mechanisms
are tenable given neurobiological structure and function.
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likely true for what neuroimaging can show us at the neural
level. For example, neuroscience work has already led many
scientists to question some of the traditional assumptions
that have guided research on social behavior in recent decades—that emotion and cognition are distinct processes,
or that implicit versus explicit attitudes are categorically distinct and stored separately in memory—and it will likely lead
us to question many other assumptions about human behavior. We have really only just begun trying to use neuroimaging methods to understand how people make social
and political decisions at the neural level, and it will likely
be the case that, in the years to come, we will continue to
learn that our current theories of human social and political behavior are incomplete.
In sum, while research in political neuroscience has increased rapidly in recent years, we still have a long way to
go before we have a clear picture of the neural mechanisms that underlie political evaluation, cognition, and decision-making. While this means there are still a number of
challenges for researchers working in this area in terms of
methods, design, and interpretation, it also means it is an
exciting time for anyone interested in the subfield of political neuroscience, either as a participant or an observer. It is
an area of research where there is still much left to explore.
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